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Recent Decisions

If it can be assumed that what the Court has done is to equate
Harlan's concept of a "forcible stop" with an arrest or seizure of the
person, then what the Supreme Court did was to lower the standard
on which an arrest can be made. It follows logically from this that a
new definition of an arrest has been formulated-one that no longer
predicates its validity on the existence of probable cause. However, if
this is true there must be some new, additional standard upon which
to authorize an encounter such as occurred between petitioner and
the officer. The Court took the view that it would be unreasonable to
prohibit a policeman from taking steps to assure himself that he would
not be harmed by the individual of suspicious behavior whom he was
investigating. However, the standard upon which such investigation
could be made was not one which the Court could easily define. It
was to be based on particular circumstances of each case substantiated
by the officer's testimony as to particular facts which warranted his
fear. Thus, the issue was formulated as "whether a reasonably prudent
man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his
safety or that of others was in danger." 40 If a police officer can be
reasonably warranted in such a belief, it seems that an "arrest and
search" of the person will be justified.
It appears that the Court has rewritten a portion of constitutional
law in order to permit an arrest to be validly made on less than probable cause. Once such an arrest has been given authority there is no
problem in granting the officer the right to search the person being
detained in order that he might protect himself while fulfilling his
duty of preventing crime and aiding law enforcement.
Donetta Wypiski

ZONING-PLANNED

UNIT DEVELOPMENT-Borough

Council is not pre-

cluded from rezoning land in accordance with a changed comprehensive plan, and the creation of a planned unit development district
permitting a mixture of uses does not vest in the planning commission
authority greater than that permitted under zoning enabling legislation.
Cheney v. Village 2 At New Hope, Inc., 429 Pa. 626, 241 A.2d 81
(1968).
.40.

Id.

at 1883.
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Prompted by the interest of appellant developer to build a planned
unit development' in the borough of New Hope, Borough Council
began consultations with the appellant. As a result the Borough Planning Commission began to study the possible passage of a new zoning
ordinance creating a planned unit development (hereinafter PUD)
district. Approximately six months after the PUD idea was first presented, the Planning Commission recommended to Council that a
PUD district be established. Council passed ordinance 160, which
established the PUD district, and ordinance 161, the effect of which was
to rezone a tract of land called Rauch Farm from low density
residential to PUD. One year before the PUD idea was presented,
Borough Council had approved the New Hope Comprehensive Plan,
which was a "detailed land use projection [that] clearly envisioned the
Rauch tract as containing only single family dwellings of low density. ' ' 2
In accordance with the procedural requirements of ordinance 160,
appellant developer presented plans for a PUD on the Rauch tract to
the Borough Planning Commission. The plans were approved, and
building permits were issued to the appellant. Appellees, who were
neighboring property owners, opposed the issuance of the building
permits. They appealed to the Zoning Board of Adjustment, which
upheld the ordinances and affirmed the issuances of the building
permits. Appellees appealed to Bucks County Court of Common
Pleas, 3 which reversed the Board, holding the ordinances invalid since
the placing of a PUD district on the Rauch tract was not in accordance
with a comprehensive plan as required by state statute,4 and for vest1. Under [planned unit development] zoning, the legislature determines what percentage of a particular [planned unit development] district must be devoted to open
space, for example, and what percentage used for dwelling units. The task of filling
in the particular [planned unit development] district with real houses and real open
spaces then falls upon [an administrative body] working in conjunction with an
individual large scale developer. . . . The ultimate goal of this so-called density or
cluster concept of zoning is achieved when an entire self-contained little community
is permitted to be built within zoning district, with the rules of density controlling
not only the relation of private dwellings to open space, but also the relation of
homes to commercial establishments such as theaters, hotels, restaurants, and quasicommercial uses such as schools and churches.
Cheney v. Village 2 At New Hope, Inc., 429 Pa. 626, 629-30, 241 A.2d 81, 83 (1968).
2. Id. at 632, 241 A.2d at 84.
3. Id. at 631, 241 A.2d at 83.
4. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 48203 (1966) provides:
Such regulations shall be made in accordance with a comprehensive plan, and
designed to lessen congestion in the streets, to secure safety from fire, panic and
other dangers, to promote health and the general welfare, to provide adequate
light and air, to prevent the overcrowding of land, to avoid undue concentration of
population, to facilitate the adequate provision of transportation, water, sewerage,
schools, parks and other public requirements. Such regulations shall be made with
reasonable Consideration, among other things, to the character of the district and
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ing too much discretion in the Borough Planning Commission. The
5
Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Two issues were presented to the court in the instant case. The first
issue was whether borough council, after approving a comprehensive
plan envisioning an area of land as containing only single-family dwellings of low density, may pass ordinances establishing a PUD district
containing many uses in accordance with a simultaneously amended
comprehensive plan. The second issue was whether borough council,
by authorizing a borough planning commission to approve building
6
plans according to minimum and maximum use-density regulations,
abrogated council's legislative function, and vested greater discretion
in a borough planning commission than that permitted under zoning
enabling legislation.
Justice Roberts, 7 speaking for the court, answered the first issue in
the affirmative and the second in the negative. The lower court's
decision was therefore reversed and ordinances 160 and 161 were
held valid.
The court's rationale was that the New Hope Comprehensive Plan
envisioning Rauch Farm tract as containing only single family dwellings of low density, was amended by the passage of ordinance 160.
Therefore ordinance 160 itself contained the amended comprehensive
plan envisioning Rauch Farm tract as containing many permissible
uses,8 and was passed in accordance with a comprehensive plan as
required by statute. 9
The requirement that zoning be done in accordance with a comprehensive plan appears to be defined by the court as zoning done
"with some demonstration of sensitivity to the [whole] community,
its peculiar suitability for particular uses, and with a view to conserving the value
of buildings and encouraging the most appropriate use of land throughout the
borough.
See also, STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT § 1 (U.S. Dept. of Commerce, rev. ed. 1926),
reprinted in P. GREEN, PLANNING LAW AND ADMINISTRATION § 12 (1962).
5. Certiorari was granted under PA. SuP. CT. R. 68 .
Where the subject matter does not fall within the statutory jurisdiction of the
Superior Court, an appeal to the Supreme Court in the nature of a certiorari from a
judgment order or decree will lie only if specially allowed by the Court or by a
Judge thereof, where a statute expressly provides that there shall be no appeal from
the decision or order or judgement or decree of a Court, or that the decision or order
or judgement or decree of a Court shall be final or conclusive, or shall not be subject
to review, or where the relevant statute is silent on the question of appellate review.
6. The instant court discussed the "range of permissible uses" at 635-36 of 429 Pa.
626, and at 86 of 241 A.2d 81.
7. With whom Musmanno, Jones, Cohen, Eagen and O'Brien, J.J., concur. Bell, C.J.,
took no part in the consideration or decision of the instant case.
8. See note 6, supra.
9.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 48203 (1966).
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and the impact the new ordinance will have on [the] community."10
The court presumed"' that such an over-all consideration was in mind
when the Borough Council passed ordinances 160 and 161, since the
PUD district had been under consideration by Council for six months
and had been specifically recommended by the Borough Planning
Commission, a body which the court felt was specially equipped to
study proposed ordinances as they relate to the whole community.
Before discussing the court's rationale as to the second issue, it is
important here to consider the impact of the instant case upon the
principle that a zoning regulation which is not in accordance with a
comprehensive plan is open to general attack on the ground that it is
unreasonable. This principle was developed in three leading Pennsylvania decisions. a2 The first of these decisions was Eves v. Zoning
Board of Adjustment, 3 where the court stated that the "focus of any
[comprehensive] plan is land use, and the consideration in the formulation of a [comprehensive] plan for the orderly development of a community must be made with regard thereto."' 4 The Eves court held that
the comprehensive plan must be in final formulation prior in time
to passage of a zoning ordinance in order to fulfill the statutory
requirement that zoning must be in accordance with a comprehensive
plan. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Key Realty Company
Zoning Case' 5 said:
the statutory mandate that zoning regulations must be "in accordance with a comprehensive plan" [is fulfilled by zoning legislation reflecting and implementing] the totality of a municipality's
program of land utilization, considering both the land resources
ayailable and the needs and desires of the community. This does
not contemplate a rigid "master plan" which attempts to answer
in minute detail every last question regarding land utilization; ...
[But it should not be] as in Eves, loose legislation permissive of
ad hoc determinations of the land utilization of .. small sections
10. 429 Pa. at 632, 241 A.2d at 84.
11. National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Twp. Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 215
A.2d 607 (1965).
12. Donahue v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 412 Pa. 332, 194 A.2d 610 (1963); Eves v.
Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 401 Pa. 211, 164 A.2d 7 (1960); Key Realty Co. Zoning Case,
408 Pa. 98, 182 A.2d 187 (1962).
13. 401 Pa. 211, 164 A.2d 7 (1960).
14. Id. at 216, 164 A.2d at 10.
15. 408 Pa. 98, 182 A.2d 187 (1962).
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of the community. [Whether the plan be formulated by a planning commission or by a zoning ordinance itself.]16
The ordinance in Eves created a new zoning classification, "F-i
Limited Industrial," but did not delineate the districts so classified.
Instead, a step by step procedure was outlined by which owners of
land within the Township could obtain "F-I" classification for their
particular properties. In Donahue v. Zoning Board of Adjustment 17 a
township enacted ordinance 151 amending its general zoning ordinance
to authorize for the first time a residential apartment house district.
The ordinance contained specific criteria to be met by apartment
house construction. Two months later ordinance 155 was adopted.
Ordinance 155 amended the general zoning ordinance and the zoning
map so as to rezone a specific area to a residential apartment house
district. The Donahue court felt that the declaration of intent which
introduced ordinance 151,18 clearly indicated that ordinance 151 and
ordinance 155 were enacted in accordance with a comprehensive plan.
In Donahue the appellants argued that mere compliance with the
statutory requirements was insufficient since the township's general
zoning ordinance specifically defined comprehensive plan. Appellants
also asserted that a separate document outlining future goals in the
nature of a master plan was required by the general zoning ordinance,
and that such a document did not exist. The court stated that the
declaration of intent in ordinance 151 showed that the township
supervisors did not intend a requirement of a rigid master plan, and
that the comprehensive plan referred to in the declaration of intent' 9
introducing ordinance 151 was the same as the plan embodied in
ordinance 151, no other being shown to exist. It seems that Cheney reaffirms the Donahue decision in no longer requiring the Eves' prerequisite that a comprehensive plan must be in final formulation prior
16.
17.

Id. at 100-101, 182 A.2d at 189.
412 Pa. 332, 194 A.2d 610 (1963).

18.

The declaration of intent introducing ordinance 151 was stated at

n. 5, at 336 of

412 Pa. 332, and 612 of 194 A.2d 610.

The purpose of establishing planned apartment districts shall be to encourage the
logical and timely development of land for apartment purposes in accordance with
the objectives, policies, and proposals of the (Comprehensive or General) Plan for
the community; to permit a variety of housing to the landscape which conforms to
the interest of the (Comprehensive or General) plan and zoning ordinance; to
assure the suitable design of the apartment in order to protect the surrounding
environment of adjacent and nearby neighborhoods; and to ensure that the proposed
development will constitute a residential environment of sustained desirability and
stability and not produce a volume of traffic in excess of the capacity for which
access streets are designed. The protective standards contained in this Article are
intended to minimize any adverse effect of the apartment on nearby property values.
19.

Id.
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in time to passage of a zoning ordinance. The court in Cheney however
seems to have reduced the two definitions in Eves and Key of zoning
done in accordance with a comprehensive plan, by now only requiring
that zoning be done "with some demonstration of sensitivity to the
[whole] community, and the impact the new ordinance will have on
[the] community."2 0 The courts in Donahue and Cheney believed that a
new zoning classification established by one ordinance and a zoning map
amended by a second ordinance should be read together. 21 Thus construed, the ordinances in Donahue and Cheney did not create the floating zone anchored only upon case by case application by landowners,
which was struck down in Eves. The courts in Donahue and Cheney
were of the opinion that while the changes in zoning were made upon
the request of a particular landowner, this factor alone does not necessarily create the evils held invalid in Eves, where the defects were
specifically created by the very terms of the Eves' ordinance.
It is submitted that the purpose of the ordinances in Cheney and
Donahue, is the same "flexible selective zoning" which was held to exceed the scope of the enabling legislation in Eves. The evil in Eves was
that the "flexible selective zoning" could be achieved only upon the
formal application of the property owner which would bring the
"floating zone" down to earth. In the instant case the "flexible selective
20.

429 Pa. at 632, 241 A.2d at 84; see also, The Pennsylvania Municipalities Plan-

ning Code, Act No. 247, § 301, 4 PURDON'S PA. LEG. SERV. at 649 (1968) which provides:

The comprehensive plan [of cities of the second class A, and third class, boroughs,
incorporated towns, townships of the first and second class and counties of the second
class A through eighth class, individually or jointly] shall include, but need not be
limited to, the following related basic elements:
(1) A statement of objectives of the municipality concerning its future development;
(2) A plan for land use, which may include the amount, intensity, and character of
land use proposed for residence, industry, business, agriculture, major traffic and
facilities, public grounds, flood plans and other areas of special hazards and similar
uses;
(3) A plan for movement of people and goods, which may include expressways,
highways, local street systems, parking facilities, mass transit routes, terminals, airfields, port facilities, railroad facilities and other similar facilties or uses;
(4) A plan for community facilities and utilities, which may include public and
private education, recreation, municipal buildings, libraries, water supply, sewage
disposal, refuse disposal, storm drainage, hospitals, and other similar uses; and
(5) A map or statement indicating the . . . municipality and its proposed development to adjacent municipalities and areas.
In preparing the comprehensive plan the planning agency shall make careful
surveys and studies of existing conditions and prospects for future growth in the
municipality.
21. Cloverleaf Trailer Sales Co. v. Pleasant Hills Borough, 366 Pa. 116, 76 A.2d 872
(1950); Donahue v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 412 Pa. 332, 194 A.2d 610 (1963); Philadelphia ex rel. Polselli v. Phillips, 179 Pa. Super. 87, 116 A.2d 243 (1955); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
46, § 562 (1952) provides, "[L]aws or parts of laws are in pari materia when they relate
to the same persons or things or to the same class of persons or things. Laws in pari
materia shall be construed together, if possible, as one law."
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zoning" can be achieved only by the informal application of the property owner which would bring the "floating zone" down to earth. It
seems that evidence of a comprehensive plan and the amendment to
such plan should have been given greater emphasis by the Cheney
court. Since zoning has to be done in accordance with a comprehensive
plan, it is submitted that before any zoning may occur, a comprehensive plan or an amendment to such plan must be expressed in writing
prior in time to the passage of an ordinance. This writing may be
maps, reports, or any studies made prior to zoning. If this is not required by the courts, then a municipal council will have a tendency
not to consider such a plan of any real importance since it is not even
considered by the courts to be important enough to be expressed on
paper prior in time to passage of an ordinance. A leading authority
has taken the view that the statutory requirement of a comprehensive
plan did not mean that such plan could "be secreted" from municipal
22
council, since then it loses its importance.
The second issue was resolved by the Cheney court in its holding that
a borough council by authorizing a borough planning commission to
approve building plans according to minimum and maximum usedensity regulations does not abrogate council's legislative function,
and does not vest greater discretion in a borough planning commission
than that permitted under zoning enabling legislation. The court's
rationale began with the premise that the job of approving a particular
PUD should rest with a single municipal body, either the borough
council, a legislative body; or one of the two administrative bodies, the
zoning board of adjustment or the planning commission. The court in23
dicated that there is nothing in the Borough Zoning Enabling Act
22. Haar, In Accordance With A Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1154 (1955).
23. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 48201 (1966) provides:
For the purpose of promoting health, safety, morals or the general welfare, councils of
boroughs are hereby empowered to regulate and restrict the height, number of
stories, and size of buildings and other structures, their construction, alteration,
extension, repair, maintenance and all facilities and services in or about such buildings and structures and percentage of lot that may be occupied, the size of yards,
courts and other open spaces, the density of population, and the location and use of
buildings, structures and land for trade, industry, residence or other purposes, and
also to establish and maintain building lines and set back building lines upon any
or all streets.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 46601 (1966) provides:

For the purpose of assuring sites suitable for building purposes and human habitation
and to provide for the harmonious development of boroughs, for the coordination of
existing streets with proposed streets, parks or other features of the official street plan
of the borough, for insuring adequate open spaces for traffic, recreation, light and air,
and for proper distribution of population, thereby creating conditions favorable to
the health, safety, morals and general welfare of the citizens, any borough is hereby
empowered to adopt, by ordinance, land subdivision regulations. Such regulations may
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which would prohibit a borough council from creating a PUD with
many permissible uses, 24 and also be specific in that no details would be

left for an administrator; such as where each building should be placed,
how large it should be, and where the open spaces are located. However the court felt the practical effect of such an ordinance would be
harmful since one of the most attractive features of PUD is 'its flexibility. The court therefore concluded that a borough council would
not be the appropriate municipal body to approve a particular PUD.
The court examined the statute 25 concerning the powers of a zoning
board of adjustment, and concluded that the powers of a borough
zoning board of adjustment in no way encompass the authority to
review and approve a PUD plan since such plan is neither at variance
with an existing ordinance, nor a special exception to it. The court
indicated that the only municipal body remaining was a borough planning commission, and established that the statute 26 concerning the
power of a borough planning commission contained no language prohibiting a commission from approving plans with reference to ordiinclude definitions, design standards, plan requirements, plan processing procedures,
improvement and construction requirements, and conditions of acceptance of public
improvements by the boroughs.
24. 429 Pa. at 635-36, 241 A.2d at 86.
25. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 48207(g)(l)-(3) (1966), specifically sets forth the powers
of a borough zoning board of adjustment:
(g) The board of adjustment shall have the following powers:
(1) To hear and decide appeals where it is alleged there is error in any order,
requirement, decision or determination made by an administrative official in the
enforcement of this article or of any ordinance adopted pursuant thereto.
(2) To hear and decide special exceptions to the terms of the ordinance upon which
such board is required to pass under such 6rdinance.
(3) To authorize upon appeal in specific cases such variance from the terms of the
ordinance as will not be contrary to the public interest, where owing to special
conditions a literal enforcement of the provisions of the ordinance will result in unnecessary hardship, and so that the spirit of the ordinance shall be observed and
substantial justice done.
26. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 46155 (1966) provides:
All plans, plots, or replots of land laid out in building lots, and the streets or other
portions of the same, intended to be dedicated to public use, or for the use of
purchasers or owners of lots fronting thereon or adjacent thereto, and located within
the borough limits, shall be submitted to the borough planning commission, and
approved by it, before they shall be recorded. It shall be unlawful to receive or
record any such plan in any public office, unless the same shall bear thereon, by
endorsement or otherwise, the approval of the borough planning commission. The
disapproval of any such plan by,the borough planning commission shall be deemed a
refusal of the proposed dedication shown thereon. The approval of the commission
shall be deemed an acceptance of the proposed dedication, but shall not impose any
duty upon the borough concerning the maintenance or improvement of any such
dedicated parts, until the proper authorities of the borough shall have made actual
appropriations of the same by entry, use, or improvement. No sewer, water, or gas
main or pipe, or other improvement, shall be voted or made, within the borough,
for the use of any such purchasers or owners, nor shall any permit for connection
with, or other use of, any such improvement existing, or for any other reason made.
be given to any such purchasers or owners, until such plan is so approved.
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nances dealing with permissible building uses. Thus the court concluded that a borough planning commission was the appropriate
municipal body to approve a particular PUD.
For a number of years, there has been a growing movement among
professional planners encouraging a departure from what is known as
Euclidian zoning, pre-set regulations with predetermined districts, and
to substitute so-called "flexible zoning. ' 27 Some flexibility has been
achieved through a variety of devices which have their legal basis
directly in the language and concepts of enabling legislation. These
devices include the substitution of performance standards in place of
specific and carefully enumerated permissible commercial uses, the
granting of variances and exceptions to avoid cases of unnecessary
hardship, and the development of a special use permit procedure to
allow some innovation within the framework of tradition and to justify less rigid exclusionary provisions.2 One of the problems raised
by these devices or any device which approaches "flexible zoning" is
that an excessive degree of administrative discretion is required to be
vested in the local planning commissions and zoning boards of adjustment. Professional planners 29 have made a strong plea for avoidance of
such overly sophisticated land use controls, and have recommended as a
principle of good zoning that specific controls requiring administrative
review be used sparingly and limited to uses or circumstances with
unique characteristics." Planners are of the opinion that general
controls which are clear, complete, uniform and virtually self-ad.
31
ministering are the most appropriate means of land use regulation.
But, whatever may be the advantages or disadvantages of administrative discretion which attaches to flexible zoning devices from a
professional planner's point of view, their use within the present structure of enabling legislation presents a serious problem of ultra vires
exercise of zoning power. 82 ,
In the problem of ultra vires exercise of zoning power as in every
other problem in municipal corporations, it is well to consider the
27. Symposium, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 197 (1955).
28. Id.
REGIONAL PLAN ASSOCIATION, ZONING ADVANCES (Tech. Bull. 86, at 1-17, 1956).
30. Id. at 2.
31. Id. at 1-17.
32, Babcock, An Introduction To The Model Enabling Act For Planned Residential
Development, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 136 (1965); Craig, Planned Unit Development As Seen
From City Hall, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 127 (1965); Mandelker, Reflections On The American
System Of Planning Controls; A Response To Professor Krasnowiecki, 114 U. PA. L. REV.
98 (1965).
29.
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Dillion rule that a borough has no powers except those expressly given
to it by state enabling legislation (or necessarily and fairly implied
therefrom), or those powers essential to the declared purposes of
borough existence.3 3 Under this traditional rule, in the event of any
doubt as to the delegation of a power, it should be resolved against the
existence of the power.3 4 Pennsylvania legislative history clearly rejects
the idea that borough planning commissions have the power to approve
plans submitted to them under PUD ordinances. In the Commonwealth, as in other states, the state enabling legislation was intended
to follow the Standard City Planning Enabling Act of 1928, published
by the United States Department of Commerce.3 5 Section 14 and section 15 of the Act deal with planning commission's discretion to operate in a flexible way with the basic requirements of use, area, and bulk.
Section 14 authorized a planning commission to adopt subdivision
regulations for adequate and convenient open spaces, for light and
air, and for the avoidance of congestion of population, including
minimum width and area of lots. Section 15 delegated to a planning
commission the power to agree with the applicant upon use, type,
area or bulk requirements or restrictions governing buildings, and
premises within the subdivision, provided such requirements or restrictions do not authorize the violation of the effective zoning ordinance of the municipality. It is significant that Pennsylvania legislation
never included section 15, but did include section 14 as applicable to
second class cities. 36 Applying the usual rule (in the event of any doubt
33.
34.
35.

Cleaver v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 414 Pa. 367, 200 A.2d 408 (1964).
Id.
STANDARD CITY PLANNING ENABLING Acr § 1 (U.S. Dept. of Commerce 1928), reprinted in C. HAAR, LAND-USE PLANNING 351 (1959).
36. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 22765 (1957), dealing with second class cities provides:
It shall be the duty of the commission to make and adopt a master plan, either as a"
whole or in sections, from time to time, for the physical development of the city and
of any land outside its boundaries which in the commission's judgment bears relation
to the planning of such city. Such plan or plans, with the accompanying maps, plats,
charts, and descriptive matter, shall show the commission's recommendations for the
future development of said territory, including among other things the general location, character, and extent of streets, viaducts, subways, bridges, waterways, water
fronts, boulevards, parkways, playgrounds, squares, parks, aviation field, and other
public ways, grounds, and open spaces, and a major street plan, the general location
of public buildings and other public property, and the general location and extent of
public utilities and terminals, whether publicly or privately owned or operated, for
water, light, sanitation, transportation, communication, power and other purposes,
and the removal, relocation, widening, narrowing, vacating, abandonment, change of
use or extension of any of the foregoing ways, grounds, open spaces, buildings, public
utilities or terminals, as well as a zoning plan for the control of the height, area, bulk,
location, occupation, and use of buildings and land. The commission may from time
to time make, adopt, and publish a part of the plan covering one or more divisions
of the city or one or more of the aforesaid or other subjects. The commission may
from time to time amend, extend or add to the plan or any section thereof.
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as to the delegation of a power, it should be resolved against the
existence of the power) the legislative provision delegating flexible
zoning authority to the planning commissions of only second class
cities and failing to delegate it to any other municipal government,
leads to the conclusion that it was the legislative intention to withhold
such flexibility from the powers of borough planning commissions.
In summary it can be said that several serious questions and problems are created by the instant decision. By what standards is the New
Hope Borough Planning Commission to determine whether proposed
uses will be approved by it? By what standards is the Commission to
accept or reject proposed density of dwelling units? Suppose the Planning Commission favors one form of open space over another set
forth in the over-all plan? In brief, the PUD ordinance is completely
devoid of any indication of a standard by which the Planning Commission of New Hope Borough is intended to grant or withhold the
approval authorized by ordinance 160. It is submitted that this ordinance, and court's decision, created possible dangers by granting to a
planning commission the power to thwart arbitrarily a developer's
plan, as well as the power to arbitrarily grant approval without limit
or restraint.
David J. Kozma

TORTS-LANDLORD-TENANT-The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has

held that a lessor is liable in trespass for non-performance of a promise
to repair which he orally made at the time of execution of the lease.
Reitmeyer v. Sprecher, 431 Pa. 284, 243 A.2d 395 (1968).
Appellants executed a written lease for a row house property owned by
appellee. When the lease was being negotiated appellants pointed out
the defective condition of the wooden porch floor. At the time of execution of the lease, and allegedly in consideration thereof, appellee orally
promised to repair the defective portion of the porch. In reliance upon
such promise, appellants executed the lease and took possession of the
premises. Two months after the entry of the appellants, and after alleged
repeated promises to repair by appellee, appellant, Mrs. Reitmeyer,
injured herself in a fall from the defective porch.
Appellants instituted an action in trespass in the Court of Common
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